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PREFACE 
The purpose of this work is to analyze the public career of Ern-
est Whitwort:.h Marland, a congressman from 1932 until 1934 and the 
tenth governor of Oklahoma. Marland' s life and political career were 
molded by the economic depression in the United States. He matured in 
a world of industrial activity which imbued him with a spirit of indi-
vidualism which brought him two f ort:.unes. After he lost his last and 
greatest private fort:.une he, like many other Americans in the early 
days of the depression, questioned the American economic system. Mar-
land turned to the government for answers. His personal ambition, 
coupled with his faith in the power of government to rule wisely and 
efficiently, led him into a political career in which he sought to 
bring Oklahoma into line with the national recovery program of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. As governor he began a "Little New Deal," but it suffered 
when confronted with the realities of human nature and politics. l'Iar-
land' s own personal ambitions likewise suffered when he .was defeated 
in senatorial contests in 1936 and 1938, but he contributed much to 
Oklahoma. His energetic effort:.s to bring the full force of national 
re'Covery to the state helped alleviate the suffering of his fellow 
Oklahomans. The focus of the thesis is upon Harland as a political 
figure; national and state developments are mentioned as they relate 
to his career. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE BEGINNINGS: FORTUNES GAINED AND LOST 
After the Civil War, the United States experienced a period of 
adjustment and change. In the West lay vast frontiers waiting to be 
explored and settled; in the South the people began the task of re-
building their society on new foundations from the ruins of the old. 
The North, having suffered minimal physical damage during the war, 
turned its attention to the development of its resources and the 
expansion of industry. Technological advances, an abundant supply of 
labor, and improved techniques of marketing promised great wealth to 
people innovative and energetic enough to apply their talents to 
industrial development. Great financial empires were built by indus-
trious Americans such as Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and 
J. Pierpont Morgan. The success of these men and thousands of other 
entrepreneurs inspired a spirit of optimism and ambition in their 
fellow Americans who held the hope for future material success. Recur-
ring stories of success and upward social mobility instilled in Amer-
icans a pride and faith in the American system which offered the 
chance for fulfillment of their dreams. 1 
Symbolic of this seemingly boundless ambition and activity was 
the western Pennsylvania city of Pittsburgh. Located at the juncture of 
the Ohio, Allegheny, and Monongahela rivers, it was the hub of 
1 
industrial activity in the Northeast. The three rivers gave the city 
ready access both to raw materials and to markets. The surrounding 
countryside, rich in coal and iron ore, made Pittsburgh the center 
for the steel industry which formed the backbone of the nation. The 
factories in this vibrant city sent massive columns of smoke billow-
ing skyward, as limitless as the ambitions of the people below. It 
was in this bustling city of industry and optimism that Ernest Whit-· 
2 
worth Marland was born on May s, 1874. 
The newborn son of Alf red and Sara Marland entered a world of 
comfort and wealth. His father, a former teacher of English and math-
ematics in England, came to the United States in 1862 to enlist in the 
Confederacy. After a brief period as a soldier, Alfred Marland entered 
business. He was particularly impressed by Pittsburgh and it was there 
that he decided to seek his fortune. He observed the careless and 
wasteful binding on the cotton bales which were stacked on wharves and 
capitalized on this situation by inventing an iron band which would 
bind the cotton efficiently. As his idea gained acceptance, he est-
ablished a mill in Pittsburgh for the manufacture of these iron bands. 
His business prospered, and he established himself and bought a house. 
He married Sara McLeod, who already had five children, and their 
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union produced two daughters, Ignatia and Charlotte, and a son, Ernest.J 
Alfred Marland had great expectations for his son's success, ex-
pressing the wish that Ernest would become a justice of the United 
States Supreme Court. Ernest was sheltered from outside influence in 
his early years, associating vdth few other children and staying close 
to his family. At the age of six, he was sent to a private school in 
Tennesee. The Arnold School was part of Rugby, an experimental com-
munity established by Sir Thomas Hughes, the author of Tom Brown's 
- -
School ~and a friend of Alfred Marland. The founders of Rugby 
envisioned an idyllic connnunity both separated from the aspects of 
American society which they found distasteful and imitative of the 
English society they had left behind them. The experimental utopia 
eventually faltered when confronted by discord among its founders 
and disillusionment among its inhabitants. Alfred Marland was among 
the disillusioned and brought his twelve-year-old son home to Pitt-
sburgh. Ernest attended public school in Pittsburgh for two years 
before enrolling in Park Institute, a preparatory school.4 
In 1891, after two years at Park Institute, Marland passed his 
entrance examinations and entered the School of Law at the University 
of Michigan. He spent two uneventful years there concentrating on his 
studies, and, at the age of nineteen, he received his LL. B. degree 
and was admitted to the bar in Michigan. He returned to Pittsburgh 
3 
where his father's modest fortune had been decimated by the depression 
of 1893 and had to seek employment in the legal profession. Because 
he could not be admitted to the bar in Pennsylvania until he was 
twenty-one, he accepted employment as a law clerk. After his admission 
to the bar, he was hired by J. M. Guffey, a promoter and entrepreneur 
who had coal and oil interests. Guffey hired Marland to inspect the 
oil and coal fields of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, to examine land 
titles, to look for mineral deposits, and to secure contracts on land 
which held promise for development. While engaged in this occupation, 
the ambitious young man began making personal investments in the 
extractive industries. He gradually acquired property in the hope of 
discovering mineral wealth underground. 5 To enhance his chances of 
success, Marland returned to the Park Institute to study geology and 
civil engineering. He believed that by applying the principles of 
geological fonnation on the surface of the land he could determine the 
probability of mineral deposits lying underneath the surface. This 
scientific approach was more orderly and effective than the haphazard 
practice of "wildcatting," or speculative drilling. 6 
Marland utilized his training in examining the countryside for 
outcroppings or geological formations which would betray the presence 
of subterranean mineral deposits. He obtained leases from farmers 
il'l West Virginia where he detected possible pools of oil or gas. In 
the spring of 1905 his persistent efforts were rewarded when one of 
his wells spewed forth gas. Marland developed his investments and 
contracted to sell gas to potteries in nearby East Liverpool, Ohio; 
within a year of his initial success he accumulated his first million 
dollars. 7 The young, ambitious lawyer-turned-entrepreneur seemed 
assured of a prosperous future. Marland had by this time acquired a 
partner to share in his good fortune. Mary Virginia Collins was a 
stenographer in Philadelphia and the daughter of a friend of the 
Marland family. Her youth and energy complemented Marland' s ambition 
and optimism, and they married in Philade~phia on November 5, 1903. 
8 Together they enjoyed the splendor afforded by his success. 
Harland's new prosperity was soon jeopardized. The banking panic 
in 1907 left five of Marland' s bank accounts empty. At the same time, 
the potteries which were the source of his wealth were forced to close 
because of the restricted market during the depression. The combined 
4 
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effect of these two events left Marland destitute, and he returned to 
Pittsburgh to salvage what remained of his holdings. When the potteries 
re-opened, he tried to renew his marketing of gas, but he found that 
the wells of the Standard Oil Company in adjacent fields had drained 
off the gas underneath his land and that his wells did not have 
sufficient pressure to pipe the remainder of the gas. 9 Marland had 
little capital with which to continue operations and surrendered his 
entire operation to a creditor, the Oil Well Supply Company. The only 
hope he held for the future was a letter of credit, valid at any 
branch of the Oil Well Supply Company, which would enable him to 
10 
obtain equipment for subsequent ventures. 
Despairing of further success in the extractive industries in the 
North, Marland left Pennsylvania determined to seek another fortune. 
He decided upon either California or Oklahoma as the site for future 
speculation. He journeyed westward to Chicago, Illinois, to visit 
relatives while he charted his course for the future, armed with onl;:r 
the letter of credit, board money for two months, and his shaken 
but not destroyed ambition. While in Chicago he talked with a young 
army o.fficer who had been stationed in Oklahoma. The soldier was a 
personal acquaintance of George Miller, the owner of the Miller 
Brothers 101 Ranch near Ponca City in northern Oklahoma. Marland 
listened attentively as the soldier spoke of the beauty of the young 
state and the excitement of the 101 Ranch. Marland decided to journey 
t th S t t d 1 th . b · 1 · t. f . t t 11 o e ooner s a e an exp ore e possi i i ies or inves men • 
Penniless and uncertain, E. W. Harland arrived at the 101 Ranch 
in December of 190$. He was little aware of the impact he would have 
on the northern prairies of Oklahoma or on the nearby town of Ponca 
City. The gently undulating prairies around Ponca City were peopled 
only by farmers, cattle, and Indians, who had been resettled by the 
United States government. Ponca City was a sleepy little trading 
town of about 2,500 and a rendezvous for the inhabitants of the area. 
Marland saw magnificent opportunities for the development of the 
. . . . 12 
virgin prairies. 
The young Pennsylvanian was enthralled by the sights and sounds 
of the 101 Ranch and explored the surrounding territory with intense 
interest. He roamed across the grasslands of northern Oklahoma, ad-
miring the landscape and looking for indications of mineral wealth. 
On an excursion with George Miller, he visited the burial ground of 
the Ponca Indian tri'Qe; while he observed the burial practices of 
the Indians he also scrutinized the topography of the land. He 
noticed outcroppings of rock and gently sloping hills which revived 
his geological expertise and led him to speculate that underneath 
the shirrunering sea of grass lay vast oceans of black gold. The entre-
preneurial spirit churned within him as he envisioned the prospect 
of again enjoying the splendor of material success. Hoping to put 
his speculation to a successful test, he obtained leases on tracts 
of land which he considered likely to contain mineral wealth. He 
enlisted the aid of the Miller brothers in leasing land on the ranch 
and in convincing the local Indian landowners to lease their land. l3 
Fired by the prospect of discovering oil or gas, Marland took his 
letter of credit to the dealership of the Oil Well Supply Company in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma. l4 'rhere he obtained the necessary supplies for his 
initial drilling operations. He encountered difficulty in moving the 
equipment to his chosen drilling sites because roads were either 
6 
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non-existent in the area or far removed from the railroads where the 
supplies were unloaded. Because draft animals were scarce in the area, 
Marland employed teams of oxen and ponies to haul the material to the 
drilling location. After Marland and the animals endured these initial 
hardships, he sank his first well which failed to produce. Undaunted 
by this early disappointment, he continued to drill in other areas. 
In the spring of 1910 he struck gas for the first time. This first 
successful well was the vanguard of hundreds which would dot the 
plains in the corning years, probing the various layers of sand and 
rock to bring oil or gas spewing to the surface. 15 
Although the Indians of the region had granted Harland the right 
to drill on their land, they disapproved of the new phenomenon which 
they believed spoiled the beauty of the landscape. The wells were 
another of the many daily reminders of the white man's influence and 
control of land and life on the plains. t•fuere once herds of buffalo 
roamed and grazed complacently, now the lonely towers stretched 
toward the sky, etched upon the horizon as reminders of a rapidly 
fading era. The "staff of life" which had sustained the Indians for 
centuries was replaced by the symbol of the white man's progress. An 
elderly Ponca Indian named Running After Arrow expressed his mis-
givings as he watched the treasure spew skyward: "Uh-h, no good, no 
good. Beautiful country all gone. 1116 Despite the misgivings of a few, 
the drilling continued to the profit of all concerned, Indians as 
well as whites. 
Marland's early success was followed by continual drilling and 
further development. He and several associates recognized the value 
of their bonanza and f onned the 101 Ranch Oil Company to market their 
product. Later they e-stablished the Kay County Gas Company, which 
eventually ran pipelines to Ponca City and 'ronkawa. Marland became 
involved in all phases of the production of oil and gas, investing 
in exploration, production, refining, transportation, and marketing 
of the subterranean treasure. He founded the Marland Oil Company 
to establish a consolidated corporate control structure which would 
enable him to maintain contact with and control of all aspects of' 
the company's management. Between 1910 and 1920 his company expanded 
its enterprises and spread drilling, refining, and marketing aper-
ations throughout the state. By 1920 Marland stood in command of a 
vast empire of tank cars, oil wells, pipelines, refineries, and 
offices. The red triangle symbol with the name "Marland" emblazoned 
across it became a familiar sight among those in the oil business. 17 
As Marland accumulated irrunense wealth in his adopted state he 
also attained great stature as a model citizen and employer. His oil 
interests employed about one-fourth of the entire working population 
of Ponca City and he was responsible for the rapid development of 
that town into an economically and culturally advanced city on the 
plains. 'rhe economic stimulus provided by Marland led to the growth 
of Ponca City from a small town of 2, 521 in 1910 to a thriving in-
dustrial community of 16,136 in 1930. The population of Kay County 
doubled during the same time period. 18 In addition to the financial 
impetus provided by the transplanted Pennsylvanian, Ponca City 
benefited in numerous other ways from Marland' s philanthropy. He 
donated money in large quantities to civic enterprises such as the 
Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and church organizations. He was a major 
contributor to the support of the orphan's home operated by the Amer-
ican Legion in Ponca City. He set aside property for an athletic 
field and clubhouse to be used by the citizens of his adopted home-
town. He donated land and money for the construction of a Masonic 
lo~ge and an American Legion Post. A golf course was built on his 
property for the use of his employees and other citizens. 19 He 
demonstrated his concern for the welfare of his employees by estab-
lishing the Marland Institute for their education and constructing 
several hundred small frame houses on separate lots which they could 
purchase on easy credit terms. 20 
Marland's personal lifestyle was one befitting an oil baron. His 
English ancestry was reflected in the spectacular life he led on his 
estate. He built a large mansion which was complete with indoor 
swimming pool, expansive manicured lawns, adjoining golf course, 
and huge gardens with lavish arrangements of flowers and plants from 
many locales. Inside the mansion were lavish decorations, expensive 
oil paintings, and elegant furniture which displayed Harland's 
taste for and appreciation of the finer things in life. The mansion 
was the scene of many extravagant parties at which social climbers 
mingled and discussed niceties as well as the latest developments in 
the petroleum industry. Marland was the host for many poker parties 
at which thousands of dollars changed hands. The prohibition of 
alcoholic beverages did not hamper the enjoyment of the visitors to 
the mansion; there was always an ample supply of spirits available. 
Marland brought a touch of England to the prairies of Oklahoma when 
he organized outings for his friends. The fields and streams of 
northern Oklahoma were crossed and recrossed by sc¥rrying foxes, 
9 
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baying hounds, and loping horses, while on other fields Oklahomans 
were introduced to the sport of polo. Marland' s friends and associates 
were treated to hunting expeditions, golf games, parties, and polo 
matches in a whirl of social activity which the plains had never 
before seen. 21 
Sharing the baronial splendor with Marland were his wife, Mary 
Virginia, and their adopted son and daughter. George and Lydie 
Roberts were the children of Mary's sister and came to live with 
their affluent relatives shortly after Marland became established in 
Ponca City. After the death of their parents, the two children were 
adopted by the Marlands in 1916. Together the family lived a life of 
leisure on the e:state. The frolicsome atmosphere was darkened by 
tragedy in June of 1926 when Mary Virginia Marland died. Two years 
later, in July of 192S, Marland had Lydie's adoption annulled, and 
th . . d 22 e pair were marne • 
Marland's reputation continued to grow until he was internation-
ally known for his keen business expertise and his philanthropy. As 
his business expanded and prospered, he developed interests and 
bank accounts throughout the Southwest. Such widespread and diverse 
operations required tremendous sums of capital with which to transact 
business, and he acquired the necessary funds by borrowing and 
carrying accounts with several banks in the region. In 1923 Marland, 
who made frequent trips to New York City for business or ple.asure, 
came into contact with a banker in New York City who arranged a 
meeting between Marland and financier J. Pierpont Morgan, Jr., who 
was interested in the oilman's operation. Marland was well aware of 
the stature of the banker; consequently he believed that the meeting 
11 
held promise for both men. Morgan suggested that Marland consolidate 
his financial liabilities and thereby save himself the trouble of 
dealing with several different banks. Centralization appealed to 
Marland, and he agreed to consolidate his financial obligations with 
the "House" of Morgan. He did not suspect that the banker might have 
ulterior motives; he only knew that consolidation made vast sums of 
money available to him for expansion. 23 
Marland hoped that his relationship with the bankers of New York 
would allow his company to expand in accordance with his decisions; 
he was sorely disappointed. When he needed $12,000,000 for expansion 
of his operation, the Morgan interests financed the entire amount by 
purchasing stock in the Marland Oil Company to insure their invest-
ment. Morgan's men then began interfering in the management of the 
company. Morgan added three new directors to the company to safe-
guard his investment. At Morgan's suggestion, an executive committee 
was formed to make policy decisions, thereby eliminating the need 
for the entire board to travel to New York City for consultation. 
This action tended to keep active members of the company out of the 
policy-making process. The directors from the Morgan camp exerted 
their influence frequently and decisively, hampering Marland's pro-
posals for improvement by vetoing his plans when they felt that 
improvements were unnecessary or costly. Business decisions were 
outweighed by the banker's voices. Without the financial tools which 
he needed f or:.-the efficient direction of the company, Marland' s 
knowledge of the petroleum industry and his keen sense for taking 
advantage of business opportunites went for nought. The pipelines, 
refineries, markets, and products Marland planned to acquire for 
12 
the enhancement of the company were never purchased. The financiers 
also used their positions on the executive committee to criticize 
Marland's labor policy; they accused him of being too friendly, 
lenient, and paternalistic toward his employees and officers. The 
New Yorkers suggested that a president be installed who would provide 
the type of stern leadership on the executive level which would 
best serve the interests of the stockholders. 24 
Marland sensed that he was being gradually and subtly phased out 
of his own operation and that the control of the company was being 
wrenched from the hands of those who had controlled Marland Oil since 
its formation. Instead of becoming a mere figurehead in his own 
empire, he chose to surrender control of the company. On October 30, 
1928, five years after his relationship with the bankers began, he 
resigned as president and chairman of the board of the Marland Oil 
Company. 25 His company was soon merged with other property controlled 
by the financiers and was absorbed by the Continental Oil Company. 
The red triangle remained a prominent emblem in the petroleum industry, 
but the name "Conoco" replaced the original "Harland" on the signs. 26 
Marland and his associates lost control of their company but were 
quick to renew their eff arts in the petroleum industry. Harland 
started another company in 1929 with confidence in its ultimate 
success, but his new venture was ill-timed. The depress.i,on hampered 
what success Marland might have had because the petroleum industry 
suffered from overproduction and low prices. Harland remained in 
Ponca City attempting to regain some of his holdings and achieve 
financial security, but his new company was not a success. 27 
13 
By the 19JO's the onetime lord of Ponca City was faced with a 
struggle for existence which he had not encountered since 1908. How-
ever, he enjoyed one more moment of glory as a reminder of his former 
stature. In the late 1920' s Marland had contracted vri.th sculptor 
Bryant Baker to construct a monument to the women who had helped tame 
the frontier and shape the character of Oklahoma and the West. He 
invested more than $200,000 of his money to the project at a time 
when he still had his fortune. After he lost his empire, he donated 
the statue to the state of Oklahoma. On April 22, 1930, the Pioneer 
Woman Statue was dedicated in Ponca City. 28 The impressive bronze 
figure of a woman and her young son striding confidently toward the 
future towered above the thousands of people who attended the cere-
mony, including the governor of Oklahoma, William J. Holloway, and 
the noted Oklahoman, humorist Will Rogers. Marland made a contribution 
to the state during a time of extreme personal misfortune. Following 
the loss of his personal wealth, all that Marland had which he could 
contribute to his adopted state was himself; to that task he devoted 
the remainder of his life. 
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CHAPTER II 
INTERLUDE IN WASHINGTON 
1932 was a year of decision for Americans. All across the land 
people who felt the effects of the economic depression wondered why 
they suffered. Poverty, sickness, hunger, and unemployment afflicted 
many Americans. More than 13,000,000 people were unemployed; with 
business in the grip of fear there was little hope of recovery. 
Families who depended on the several million unemployed people for 
support multiplied the tragic effects of the depression. As the lives 
of these people were altered by the depression, they searched for 
the reason for their plight. Many Americans placed blame for the 
condition of the country on the Republican administration of President 
Herbert Clark Hoover. Faced with inability to solve their problems, 
distressed people criticized Hoover for not solving them, but the 
president was hesitant about taking overt action to rectify the situ-
ation. Like many other Americans who had grown to maturity in an age 
of prosperity and industrial expansion, Hoover maintained that the 
American system of private enterprise and individual initiative 
would overcome the depression. Hasty action by the government to 
alleviate the economic ills of the country might compound the situ-
ation and further alter the system which had temporarily broken down. 1 
· . .-.• Most people did not fully understand the complex causes of the 
depression, and to many confused and hungry people the causes were 
16 
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not as important as the solution. They realized that something had to 
be done to correct immediate problems such as hunger and unemployment. 
In 1932, after being denied the presidency for twelve years, the Demo-
cratic Party offered leadership through the nomination of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt for the presidency. To restore the economy to stabi-
lity, the Democrats fashioned a program which assigned to the federal 
government power and responsibility which was unprecedented in the 
history of the nation. According to the Democratic promise, economic 
difficulties on such an enormous scale could only be overcome by an 
equally enormous effort on the part of the national government. Roose-
velt and his party in most instances had little idea about how they 
would solve specific problems, but they wanted to exhaust all efforts 
to do whatever was necessary. The prospect of positive action which 
might alleviate the distress of the nation led to a Democratic victory 
in the presidential election in November of 1932. The Democrats won 
enough seats in both houses of Congress to insure passage of Roose-
2 
velt' s program. 
Ernest Marland was one of many Democrats who rode into office on 
the bandwagon of Roosevelt and the New Deal. Like many other people 
in the country, Marland had experienced several years of prosperity 
and optimism only to face extreme economic reversal in the late 1920's. 
Like others, he also looked for an explanation for his misfortune. 
Marland saw the malfunction of the system as the reason for his 
plight and that of his fellow Americans. He beli-eved that the system 
had to be changed or controlled. Because that control could only be 
exerted efficiently by the government, he sought to use that avenue 
to bring about changes which would insure control and prevent the 
18 
reoccurrence of such a national disaster. The former oilman, popular 
despite the loss of his fortune, defeated two opponents in the Demo-
cratic primary by a total of 10,864 votes to their combined 9,610.3 
His next opponent for the congressional seat from the Eighth District 
was Republican Milton c. Garber of Enid. Garber, the incumbent, had 
served in that position for a decade. Marland based his campaign on 
the Democratic promise to restore the government to the people. He 
condemned the financial interests in the nation for taking control of 
the economic structure and ruining it. He warned the voters of the 
Eighth District that they had to support Roosevelt, the candidate 
who would take control from the moneyed interests and return it to 
the people.4 
The issue in the election of 1932 was, Marland believed, "an age-
old battle - the struggle between a small group with enormous power 
and millions oppressed by that power."5 Marland exhorted the voters 
to use their political freedom and vote for the Democratic party so 
that they would not lose their economic freedom. 6 He urged the 
people of the northeni plains to allow him to represent them in the 
fight against economic centralization. He relied heavily on his own 
bitter experience \o convince voters of the threat posed by the 
big capitalists. He told his listeners that he lost his fortune be-
cause of the manipulations of the J. P. Morgan Company and warned them 
that the moriey trusts must not be allowed to control the government 
the way they controlled his company. The policies of the Republican 
administrations of the previous twelve years had allowed too much 
power to seep into the hands of the moneyed interests. 7 By restoring 
the regular economic order, Marland and his fellow Democrats were 
19 
going to "take the government out of the hands of big business118 
which would then allow them to take the people's "business out of the 
hands of government. 119 The government was to be used to restore order, 
not to destroy the economic base of the country. 
Garber was identified with the Republican policies of the 1920's 
which were blamed for the depression. The potential advantage that 
Garber had as an incumbent was nullified by this stigma and the prob-
ability of Roosevelt's election. Voters did not want to send a man 
to Congress who would work against the president. 10 The promise of 
the New Deal and t1arland's personal popularity throughout the oil 
and wheat producing regions of the Eighth District helped him win 
the election. He received 51, 404 votes to Garber' s 31, 677. 11 Marland' s 
victory marked the first time that a Democrat had held the seat from 
the Eighth District. 
In March of 1932 Marland joined the other members of the Seventy-
third Congress, which was respnsible for implementing President Roose-
velt 1 s pledge to give the nation a New Deal. The Democratic majority 
in Congress assured the adoption of the president's plans. for the 
recovery of the nation. During the first session of Congress, in the 
"Hundred Days War," the president sent a barrage of proposals to 
the representatives of the people. These proposals dealt with ma~y 
different problems, but all were designed to counteract the defi• 
ciencies in the economy. Virtually rubber-stamping Roosevelt's 
program, Congress enacted several major laws designed to deal with 
the emergency which confronted the country. Banks were closed until 
federal investigations assured depositors that the banks were solvent, 
thereby restoring public confidence in the financial structure of the 
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nation. Thousands of young men were given jobs in the Civilian Con-
servation Corps, which took them off the unemployment lines and put 
them to work improving the nation's natural resources. The Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration was established to give governmental 
assistance to people who could not find work or who were unable to 
work. Fanners received the assistance of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, which by providing national regulation of agri-
cultural production sought to raise agricultural prices and help 
fanners achieve parity. The government aided people in refinancing 
their homes and in building new homes so that they would not be 
forced to join the masses of homeless people already roaming the 
land. In the National Industrial Recovery Act, New Dealers hoped to 
eliminate the problems in industry which had led to the depression. 
Industries were to draw up codes of fair conduct and competition 
which would restore balance to the economy and insure workers and 
employers of equitable treatment. Extensive appropriations provided 
for the employment of millions of people on public works projects. 
With these initial ref onns, the administration hoped to counter the 
most adverse effects of the depression. 12 
The freshman legislator from the Eighth Congressional District 
of Oklahoma supported the main outline of the New Deal. Hany of the 
problems faced by the nation as a whole were particularly acute in 
Oklahoma; :Marland acquiesced in the whirl of rubber-stamping because 
he was acting directly in the interests of his constituents in 
virtually every action he took while in Congress. 13 He held reser-
vations about such precipitous action on the part of the New Dealers, 
and he worried about the submissiveness of Congress, but the dire 
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emergency confronting the country led him to approve legislation 
which granted broad discretionary power to the executive branch and 
unprecedented power to the national government. l4 1'Il1ile Marland sup-
ported necessary measures which expanded governmental control of 
various sectors of the economy, he retained a strong faith in the 
worth of the individual and the spirit of rugged individualism in the 
United States in which he had matured. His personal ventures in busi-
ness and his ultimate success in finding oil in Oklahoma were proof 
of the value he placed on individual effort. Harland wanted the 
government to help the people through the hardship of the depression 
but did not want it to destroy future incentive for success. His 
hesitancy with regard to governmental control was at least partially 
motivated by his desire to insure all Americans of the opportunity 
to succeed; extensive governmental control might hamper the initiative 
of the entrepreneur and leave chances for advancement solely in the 
hands of those who had already achieved material succeess. 15 
Marland supported the president on most issues, but given the 
responsibility, he would have given some aspects of the New Deal a 
varied flavor. He approved the administration's bill for the relief 
of farmers, which provided for reduction of acreage in order to 
raise prices, but did not believe that acreage reduction was the 
proper solution. Harland maintained that the adjustment bill would 
not have the desired effect of increasing farm income but would 
"increase the farmer's difficulties by giving him two bosses where 
he now has one, 1116 referring to bankers and the new bureaucrats 
responsible for implementing the act. The answer, according to Har-
land, lay in the inflation of currency to increase purchasing power. 17 
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The fonner oilman's qualified acceptance of the New Deal was also 
reflected by his reaction to the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
part of which required the establishment of codes of fair conduct for 
industry, to be written by the members of each industry and approved 
by the president. Although Marland gave the act his tacit approval, 
he was concerned about the effectiveness of such codes. He voiced 
his fear most explicitly regarding the industry with which he was 
most familiar, the petroleum industry. The disparity in size and 
wealth of petroleum corporations led Marland to fear that the large 
conglomerates would dominate the writing of the codes to the detriment 
of the small or independent companies. He warned all oil producers 
to protect the interests of their companies by participating actively 
in the f onnulation of the codes. A company such as the Uarland Oil 
Company which controlled refining, production, pipelines, and mar-
keting could not be expected to write a code which would be fair to 
1°' a company engaged in only one aspect, such as drilling or refining. u 
The activity and interest of the fledgling representative from 
Ponca City while he was in Washington, D. c., reflected his personal 
interest in specific ref onns. Through his own experience he was 
qualified to speak on several issues with authority. His previous 
career as the head of a large company allowed him to deal with prob-
lems inherent in industrial legislation and to recognize the effect 
such legislation would have on business and the economy. The man who 
climbed from wildcat driller to entrepreneur spoke out repeatedly. 
on governmental regulation of the petroleum industry. The millionaire 
who had watched his company wrested from his grasp by financiers 
displayed an active interest in limiting the power of financial 
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institutions. t-n'lile he rose to speak in Congress on several subjects, 
he also served on the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, a position in which the former prince of the oil industr-:J 
could off er valuable insight because of his experience in interstate 
and international business negotiations. 19 
Marland' s most active role was in the regulation of the petroleum 
industry. He introduced several bills which dealt with the marketing 
of oil. 20 In the depressed condition of the industry prices were low, 
and production was high. Marland maintained that the guiding hand 
of the government could provide the answer to the economic distress 
of oil producers. He saw a need for cooperation among producers and 
among the oil-producing states which would allocate proportionate 
shares of the market and keep all companies in business. Continual 
price wars and cut-throat competition for cheap oil threatened to 
destroy the individual producers and cause untold damage to the 
industry as a whole. 21 
The pressing necessity for cooperation among states and producers 
was made even more evident by the problem caused by the shipment of 
''hot oil," or oil produced and marketed ·.in violation of governmental 
regulations or industrial codes. The restrictions placed on the maj-
ority of the petroleum companies by the national recovery program 
were nullified by the effect of the sale of illegally marketed oil. 
Cooperation had to be virtually unanimous in the industry for the 
regulatory guidelines to have the desired effect. Bootlegged oil kept 
prices l.ow and destroyed the incentive for compliance with the law. 
Marland int reduced a bill which provided governmental supervision of 
the shipment of oil by granting the Secretary of the Interior broad 
powers to enforce regulatory laws. The Secretary could fix prices, 
hours, and wages as he saw the necessity to do so. Host important 
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of the powers was that of determining the market demand for oil and 
gas and allocating on equitable proportions to the oil-producing 
states their share of the total market. 22 In this manner the govern-
ment could detennine how nruch oil was produced in a certain state 
and whether oil was produced in compliance with quotas. Gas or oil 
had to be certified as being produced in accordance with the act 
before it could be shipped out of the state. Fines were to be levied 
on individuals and corporations for violation of shipping rules, 
and excess production was to be taxed as a deterrent to glutting the 
market. Marland had the approval of the administration in drafting 
the bill, which was matched by a similar bill in the United States 
Senate. Neither of these bills passed because President Roosevelt 
substituted his own amendment to the Industrial Recover"IJ Act which 
incorporated the basic provisions of Marland' s bill. 23 The inter-
vention of the federal government into the problem of illegally 
produced oil helped restore equitable production and the industl'."J 
became virtually self-regulatory. 24 
Congressman Marland expressed concern about other aspects of the 
petroleum industry. He hoped to provide protection for independent 
producers who were forced by financial expediency to ship and market 
their oil through pipelines owned by large conglomerates. Unless the 
government strictly regulated the pipelines, Marland believed that 
small and independent producers would remain at the mercy of the 
larger, wealthier corporations whose monopoly would allow them to 
drive independents into bankruptcy. He believed that if the large 
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conglomerates were allowed to draw up the codes provided for by the 
Industrial Recovery Act, they would not provide protection for these 
smaller companies in the shipment of their oil. 25 His agitation on 
this subject, added to the influence of other congressmen and lobby-
ists, led to the adoption of a provision in the Industrial Recovery 
Act which gave President Roosevelt the power to institute proceedings 
against holding companies found guilty of monopolistic practices 
and to fix reasonable rates for the shipment of oil, thereby pro-
tecting the small producers against unfair practices by the large 
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comparues. 
Marland recognized that the United States was blessed with an 
abundance of petroleum; indeed, it seemed that there was too much 
oil to many who were trying to sell it on a depressed market. How-
ever, the former oilman realized that the future might reveal a 
shortage of the valuable natural resource. He wanted state govern-
ments to pass and enforce laws to insure the conservation of e:dsting 
oil supplies. He believed that the federal government should assist 
in the enforcement of these laws. The overproduction in the industry 
threatened the closing of small wells in favor of larger, flush wells. 
The United States would someday need the product of the small wells, 
but if they were forced to close down because of competition, the 
nation would lose the oil. The small wells might be forgotten or 
might be too expensive to reopen at a later date. He asserted that 
the more numerous small wells would ultimately exceed production of 
the currently heavy producing wells and that to lose the benefit of 
these marginal wells would leave vast amounts of an irreplaceable 
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natural resource wasted. 
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In addition to his actions relating to the petroleum industry, 
Congressman Marland devoted his attention to reform of the financial 
structure of the nation. He gave his support to the Glass-Steagall 
Banking Act, which provided for the separation of commercial and 
investment banking and guaranteed bank deposits, 28 and the Truth-in-
Securities Act, ~lh.ich required full financial disclosure when com~: 
panies issued "new securities. 29 He took advantage of his personal 
experience with the New York bankers to demonstrate to his colleagues 
the effect of the intermingling of commercial banking and investment 
banking. He had repeatedly said during his campaign that the money 
trust had to be broken, and he continued to attack the bankers. He 
sought to break their control on the financial and economic affairs 
of the nation by suggesting that it be made illegal for bankers to 
sit on the boards of directors of corporations. He warned his col-
leagues that they must resist the influence of bankers on the 
government because the government could become entangled by borrowing 
money from the major banking.houses, thereby extending their influence 
even further. JO He maintained that the government should not put 
itself at the mercy of the banking system in its search for methods 
to revitalize the economy. 
Marland believed that the depression had occurred in part because 
batiking and securities interests had extended their operations into 
too many other sectors of economic activity. The operation of com-
panies and corporations became inextricably bound to the whims of 
bankers who had little knowledge of business, thereby constricting 
business activity. Marland wanted to insure that the financial oper-
ations of the money trust were subject to public disclosure, thereby 
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averting further disastrous secretive dealings mich might disrupt 
the economy. During the industrial and financial distress of the 
early 1930's, his arguments found receptive listeners. Governmental 
regulation of financial activity became a major part of the New Deal 
because of the agitation of Marland and his colleagues.31 
Congressman Marland became acutely aware of the hardships suffered 
by his fellow Oklahomans while he served in Congress. One of the 
major difficulties faced by people in the early years of the depres-
sicm was a shortage of homes. The New Deal approached this problem 
along with all the others, and Marland believed he had at least a 
partial solution. He advocated governmental financing of subsistence 
homesteads to settle the thousands of homeless people who were roam-
ing the highways and crowding the city streets. He maintained that 
if the aimless, unemployed wanderers were given a plot of land, a 
house, and provided with tools and seeds for planting that the 
country would benefit socially and financially because these people 
would no longer be on the relief rolls. He envisioned an idyllic 
life in which there was always shelter, employment, and food. He 
asserted that this back-to-the-land movement would also profit by 
the diversification of crops, reducing the reliance of farr.iers on 
a single cash crop. 32 Marland had provided such homes for his 
employees in Ponca City and believed that the federal government 
might follow his example, but the New Deal subsistence homesteads 
were not implemented on a grand scale such as he proposed. The 
federal government did attempt several isolated projects, but the 
idea did not gain wide acceptance. 33 
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While he tried to reform the oil industr<J and financial activities 
of the nation, Marland joined other representatives from the South-
west in demanding effective flood contrbl and public NOrks projects. 
He suggested that Congress establish a separate authority, similar 
to the Tennessee Valley Authority, for the control of waterways in 
the basins of the Arkansas and Red Rivers.34 This authority, as 
proposed by Marland, would provide control of floods, development of 
electric power, ref ore station of land, and irrigation and terracing 
of farm lands in the watershed of the Arkansas River. 35 He maintained 
that the people of the area would benefit in myriad ways and that 
local or regional supervision of development would serve the people 
more efficiently than national supervision. The problems peculiar 
to each area could be dealt with by people familiar with the region. 
'rhe program would be more effective if it were autonomous and not 
reliant on the whims and ignorance of federal administrators far 
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removed from the project. 
While serving his constituents in the United States House of 
Representatives, Marland became .familiar with the program of the 
president and approved of the things Roosevelt planned to do to 
bring about recovery of the economic system. Harland also became 
painfully aware of the problems which faced his fellow Oklahomans, 
who needed relief funds, jobs, housing, food, and, perhaps most 
importantly, hope for the future. He realized that the only way 
Oklahomans could recover from the depression was to cooperate with 
the national effort. A program implemented by the state government 
alone, financed by ta..."dng an already overburdened economic base, 
could not provide adequate funds for the type of recovery operations 
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provided by the New Deal. Federal-state cooperation in financing and 
implementing reforms seemed to Marland the only answer. People 'l!Jho 
had suffered for years did not want to continue suffering while wait-
ing for the elusive return to prosperity. Marland saw an appalling 
disparity between the productive capacity of his state and the piti-
ful condition of many of its inhabitants. He added his votes and 
recommendations concerning oil, ban.Y..ing, and the needs of his region 
to the general clamor for reform. As an inexperienced legislator, he 
had relatively minor personal power or influence in the Congress, but 
he initiated several bills and promoted discussion and consideration 
of these and other bills. 
As he became increasingly familiar with the New Deal, Congressman 
Marland decided that he could serve the state of Oklahoma in a much 
more effective way. He determined that he would be better able to 
exert his personal influence as the chief executive of the state than 
as one of its representatives. The term of Governor 1-Jilliam H. "Alfalfa 
Bill" Murray expired in January of 1935, .and the office Nas open to 
a large field of aspirants because Murray was prohibited ·by the con-
stitution of the state from succeeding himself. Governor Murray had 
personal animosity for President Roosevelt, as both sought the Demo-
cratic nomination for the presidency in 1932 •. Murray subsequently 
became bitter to"t.,ard Roosevelt and the New Deal. 37 Throughout the 
remainder of his term as governor, Murray opposed the New Deal fllld 
clashed with federal administrators concerning funds for relief, 
public wcrks projects, and federal-state cooperation and responsi-
bility. His mismanagement of relief funds and his questionable use 
of patronage eventually led the federal officials to tak~ on the 
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responsibility for relief °t'tlich they felt he could not administer 
properly.38 Harland sought to replace this attitude of recalcitrance 
with one of cooperation and to bring the New Deal into Oklahoma by 
using the power of the governorship to implement a federal-state 
alliance. 
In seeking the Democratic nomination for governor of Oklahoma, 
the adopted Sooner risked his political career. He gave up the oppor-
tunity to seek almost certain re-election as congressman, but he 
thought that the entire state needed his serviccs.39 His desire to 
see that Oklahoma participated fully in the national recovery plan 
encouraged his candidacy. In April of 1934 Marland described the 
reasons for his candidacy in a radio address to his fellow Oklahomans. 
He deplored the fact that the state had declined so far in the short 
twenty-seven years since statehood. He not.ed .. the~distressing condition 
of a large portion of the state's population, particularly the appal-
ling disparity between potential productivity and actual deprivation. 
He asserted that lack of planning explained the plight of the state. 
He pointed out that much of Oklahoma's wealth had gone to manuf ac-
turers and creditors from outside the state; in spite of the large · 
productive eapacity of Oklahoma's farms, nearly one-fourth of the 
families in the state had received some form of relief. Proper plan-
ning would correct this desperate situation, and that planning would 
come from "a student of economics and an·experienced organizer of 
industry and an executive who can handle an organization. 114° With 
his administrative acumen, newly-acquired political wisdom, and 
strong faith in Roosevelt's guidance, Harland left the United States 
Congress on his campaign to bring the New Deal to Oklahoma.41 
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CHAP'.CER III 
THE NEW DEAL IMPLEMENTED AND IMPAIRED 
In seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for governor, 
Harland joined more than a dozen other contenders, including former 
governor Jack Walton, Speaker of the House Tom Anglin, and active 
Democrats J. Berry King and Gomer Smith. His most formidable opponent 
was Anglin, who had the support of retir-lng governor William H. tfar-
ray. Because the nomination of the Democratic Party was virtual 
assurance of election in the heavily Democratic state, the primary 
campaign of 1934 was waged in earnest among the aspirants. The most 
prominent issue was the acceptance of the New Deal. Hurray' s con-
tinual castigation of the president and his support of Anglin drew 
the lines of battle between supporters and opponents of the national 
program. Marland based his campaign on his record of support for 
Roosevelt, with his reputation as a strong New Dealer in Congress 
aiding his appeal. He left the management of his campaign to his 
staff of loyal advocates in the early stages because he had to 
complete his obligations in Washington. When he returned to Oklahoma, 
he and his efficient staff embarked on a campaign blitz, addressing 
crowds of voters all across the state, many days speaking before 
audiences in several towns. He continually stressed the themes of 
governmental planning, business-like administration of government, 
and federal-state cooperation. The most pressing and immediate 
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problem was unemployment, and Marland promised that he irJOUld give 
priority to that problem. 1 His shrewd campaigning and the promise of 
positive action vaulted him into the lead in the balloting in the 
primary in July of 1934.2 He collected 156,885 votes to runner-up 
Anglin's 101,698.3 With the remaining contenders far behind and no 
candidate with enough votes to capture the nomination, Marland and 
Anglin faced a run-off for the nomination. Another campaign proved 
unnecessary when Anglin withdrew his name from contention, stating 
that in the interests of the Democratic Party and the state he 
would accede Marland's victory. Anglin realized that a bitter run-
'-
off campaign would be disruptive to the unity of the party. 4 
With the nomination in hand and the office of governor beckoning, 
Marland turned his attention to the campaign against his Republican 
opponent, former United States Senator William B. Pine, and the 
Republican Party. Marland attacked Pine as an exponent of the "old 
deal" which had led the country to its present distress. 5 The state 
Democratic Convention incorporated Marland' s plans into its platform, 
which included planks calling for cooperation with the president 
and for provisions for relief. 6 The general election was looked upon 
as a mere formality because of Democratic strength, but Pine and the 
Republicans took every opportunity to attack the New Deal. 7 
Marland officially opened his campaign in September and devoted 
his speeches to expounding the merits of the New Deal. He appealed to 
farmers and workers who had been helped by the New Deal to register 
their support by voting for Democrats. He admitted that some aspects 
of the New Deal needed correction but told his listeners to "ask 
yourself the simple question: Am I better or worse off than I was 
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last year?"8 He emphasized the wealth of the state and deplored the 
fact that "after twenty-seven years of hard work, enterprise and 
careful living, we find ourselves hundreds of millions of dollars in 
debt •••• 09 ke touched the problem of taxation and fann prices and 
said that the people could not pay their taxes unless they received 
equitable prices for their products. He was criticized by Republicans 
for addressing national instead of state issues but def ended himself 
by saying "when I talk about getting the price of commodities up 
and the price of the dollar down, I'm talking about the most impor-
tant state issue which confronts a suffering people."10 Harland saw 
Oklahoma as a microcosm of the national situation and therefore he 
talked about national developments. His idea of providing subsistence 
homesteads would, he suggested, solve several problems. The unemployed 
could put idle natural resources to work building homes for the 
homeless and bolstering small fanners. 11 
Marland spoke of a new concept of the role of government, asser-
ting that it was the duty of the government to provide work for 
those who were able and willing to work and to take care of those 
who were unable to work. Because all people were not needed in 
industry, public works projects had been established; he suggested 
that the people think of such work as honorable and useful. 12 He 
stated that Oklahoma had not done its share in the recovery effort 
by providing matching funds and promised that more would be done. 13 
The combination of the promise of the New Deal and traditional 
Democratic voting gave Marland a convincing victory in November of 
1934; he defeated Pine by a total of 365,992 votes to 243,341. 14 
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Marland appointed voluntary committees to study the problems of 
the state government and to make recommendations to him. These com-
mittees studied various aspects of the structure of the government 
and the specific problem areas to be dealt with by Harland's ad.mini-
stration. The governor-elect made frequent public announcements to 
the press to keep the people abreast of developments. He met with 
newly elected legislators at his home in Ponca City on several 
occasions to discuss prospects for cooperation in the new admini-
stration. 15 The assistance of the legislature was crucial to the 
success of the Harland program for recovery, and the governor-elect 
knew that he must convince the senators and representatives of the 
soundness of his proposals. The Democratic Party controlled both 
houses of the legislature for the impending legislative session of 
1935, and shortly after the general election the Democratic caucus 
selected leaders for both houses. 1Leon C. Phillips of Okemah was 
chosen as speaker of the house and Claud Briggs of Wilburton was 
chosen president pro tempore of the senate. 16 Early in January of 
1935, shortly before taking office, Marland met with the leaders 
of the legislature at his home in Ponca City. Marland emphasized. 
that they shoud give priority to appropriations for emergency 
relief. The major recipients of the relie.f funds would be elderly 
persons and people who were unable to work. The New Dealer sketched 
the outlines of his plan of action for the new session and asked for 
the salons' continued support in the days ahead. 17 
The new chief executive took the oath of office on January 14, 
1935. In his inaugural address he told the people of Oklahoma that 
"the machinery of our government is antiquated •••• The old order 
37 
18 
of things is passing. A new order must be developed." Although he 
maintained that the capitalistic system had broken down, he did not 
advocate eliminating it entirely; the profit motive and private enter-
prise had to be preserved. He suggested that the people join their 
government in attacking the evil parts of the system and in restoring 
America to the stature of previous years. 19 He reiterated his stand 
for cooperation with President Roosevelt in providing funds for 
relief and public works. He called attention to the fact that the 
federal government would no longer provide relief funds after February 
1 for people able to work. Those people would be given employment on 
public works, but the state had to provide assistance for the old 
and the infinn. Marland warned the people of his state that they 
would soon have to pay more money in taxes to provide revenue for 
recovery activities but that they should bear this new tax burden 
cheerfully because their money was helping their less fortunate 
fellow men. He promised to make the distribution of taxation equitable 
so that no one sector of the economy would suffer more than any 
other sector. 20 
The next day the new govemo~ presented his progra~ to the joint 
session of the legislature. He advised the legislators of his pre-
liminary efforts .in plarming, referring to the voluntary committees 
and his action in contracting with the Brookings Institution to 
report on the government and administration of Oklahoma. Harland 
wished to utilize these reports in future planning. Because the report 
of the Brookings Institution would not be completed until after the 
adjournment of the legislature, he advised the solons to consider 
revenue measures which would last only until the end of the next 
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fiscal year. After that time, the reports could be incorporated in 
an efficient attack on state problems. Harland repeated his concern 
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about the problems of relief and unemployment. 
Governor Marland recommended the establishment and finacial sup-
port of several boards to coordinate the activities of the state in 
its effort to counter the effects of the depression.IForemost among 
these proposed boards was a state planning board which would develop 
and coordinate plans for the effective use of the natural, agricul-
tural, industrial, and human resources of the state. Another board 
was to deal with the problems of flood control, soil erosion, irri-
gation, and reforestation. To aid in the resettlement of homeless 
people and to help finance homes, Marland suggested the establishment 
of a housing board. To deal with the problem of f anine in a land of 
abundance and unemployment in a land of vast natural wealth, he pro-
posed a board to encourage and direct new industries in the state. 
Marland also requested a highway board and suggested that the members 
of the specific agencies be named ex-officio members of the state 
planning board. In this way all the problems of the state could be 
put into perspective and resources and money could be allocated 
accordingly. Marland requested appropriations of specific amounts 
for each of his proposals. 22 
Marland demonstrated his forethought and efficiency by suggesting 
emergency revenue measures to provide funds to implement his program. 
\ His suggestions included an increase in the tax on gasoline which 
\ 
would fund the operation of the highway board. A severance tax on 
crude petroleum and natural gas would provide revenue for the remain-
ing four boards. To enhance the general revenue fund of the state 
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he proposed additional emergency taxes on personal incomes, rental 
incomes, inheritances, insurance premiums, cigarettes, and .salaries. 
r/ To raise revenue to meet the relief problem, he advocated a 3 percent 
tax on sales and services, with two-thirds of the money for relief 
and one-third for the support of the common schools. He concluded 
his message by urging the legislators to act promptly on the emer-
gency measures "in the name of suffering humanity. 1123 
Marland demonstrated in the early days of his administration that 
he had a plan of action for Oklahoma. He considered the needs of the 
state and wanted the government to attack these needs. His proposals 
for a "Little New Deal" proved that he wanted to fol1ow Roosevelt's 
example. His plan was undoubtedly modeled after the New Deal because 
he had seen the success of the president's plan. Because the New Deal 
was based on federal-state cooperation, many of Marland' s proposals 
were designed to dovetail with national programs already in operation. 
The gove:cnor had seen the methods employed successfully by the pres-
ident while he was in Congress and sought to use the same approach. 
He relied heavily on the advice of experts such as the Brookings 
Institution and the voluntary committees and believed that the estab~ 
lishment of boards or cormnissions to deal with various aspects was 
the best and most efficient solution. This approach closely approxi-
mated Roosevelt's establishment of the "alphabetical agencies." It 
seemed that in bringing the New Deal to Oklahoma Marland had pla-
giarized from Roosevelt's book. 
The resemblance with the national program was not complete. Un-
fortunately Marland did not experience the same success as had the 
president during his "100 Days" of whirlwind legislative approval. 
The governor's program, particularly the monetary demands that it 
placed upon the state, brought heavy criticism. His proposals for 
raising revenue touched every economic interest in the state, thereby 
fulfilling his pledge to distribute taxes equitably; this also meant 
that opposition to the new taxes came from every economic interest 
in the state. Business interests and consumers opposed the increase 
of the sales tax, 24 and the oil industry did not welcome the prospect 
of heavier taxes on production of petroleum. 25 Harland had not anti-
cipated the opposition to his program. He had been generous with his 
personal fortu:ae which he had accumulated in the 1920's, and as 
governor he expected to be equally generous to the needy people of 
Oklahoma. lHis charitable spirit and generosity were not shared by 
all Oklahomans who were themselves suffering hard times and who did 
not believe that they could spare the additional money needed to 
fund the "Little New Deal." The concern of the taxpayers was reflected 
by their representatives in the legislature. 'rhe solons were hesi-
tant in following Marland' s expensive crusade without careful 
consideration of the consequences, both political and economic. 26 
Obstruction of his emergency measures in the legislature infur-
iated the new governor. At the end of the sixth week of the session, 
the only measure proposed by the governor ivhich had passed both 
houses was a tax of three cents per pack on cigarettes. rrhe governor, 
alanned at the prospect of his program being blocked, appeared before 
a joint cat:1-cus and appealed to the legislators to consider his emer-
gency proposals. He emphasized the necessity for the establishment 
of the boards he had recommended, particularly the p~arming board; 
he wanted to demonstrate to the federal government that Oklahoma was 
willing to put forth a solid effort to solve its ovm problems and 
cooperate with the Roosevelt administration. The necessity for 
matching funds for relief and public works projects was a dominant 
factor in the governor's desire to develop a program for the state. 
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With the aid of federal matching funds, the state could finance pro-
jects which it could not afford otherwise. Unless the state proved 
its willingness to uphold its share of the financial burden, many 
projects would be lost due to :Shortage of funds, and the people 
who were thus unemployed would have to rely on relief funds. 27 
The slow, deliberate pace of the legislature was caused primarily 
by the fiscal conservatism of the house. The leader of the conser• 
vative element in the house was the powerful speaker, Leon C. Phillips. 
The dynamic, red-haired, cigar-chewing legislator defended his 
opposition to the extensive appropriations by asserting that the 
legislature was merely following the will of the people. Referring 
to the governor's expensive program, Phillips stated that the house 
was fully prepared to provide for the care of the destitute citizens 
but was at the smae time "conservative enough to save the state 
from the hallucinations of dreamers. 112S Phillips suggested funding 
only necessary budget items and then considering the governor's· 
proposals if the state could pay for them. These necessary items, 
according to Phillips, included balancing the state budget, providing 
the necessary operating expenses of the state government, providing 
relief for unemployables, and supporting the schools. 29 
Marland' s troubles with the legislature were not restricted to 
the house chamber. A conflict arose in the senate early in his 
administration. The point of contention was the confirmation of 
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gubernatorial appointees. Some members of the senate balked at 
rubber-stamping Marl:and's selections for state offices because they 
believed that the senators should have a prominent voice in the 
selection process. In this manner some of the distribution of pat-
ronage could be retained in the senate, thereby increasing the 
influence and prestige of that body and its members. The senators 
also complained that Governor Marland' s selections were not equitably 
distributed throughout the state, because most of his initial appoint-
ments had beeri men from either Oklahoma or Kay counties with whom he 
was familiar. 30 Marland argued that appointments were the respon-
sibility of the executive branch. The governor and the senators 
eventually reached an accord and the senate staunchly supported the 
governor for the remainder of the session.31 
Marland demonstrated his continuing exasperation with the failure 
of the legislature to act on his proposals in early March of 1935 
when he appealed directly to the people of the state through a state-
wide radio broadcast. The governor spoke to his constituents about 
his program and about legislative obstruction. He reminded the people 
of the mandate he had received in the election to follow the recovery 
plan of President Roosevelt. He lambasted the members of the house 
of representatives for blocking his and, in effect, the president's 
program for helping Oklahoma. He praised the .senate for its cooper-
ation but charged that the members of the house were acting under 
the influence of special interest groups and tax dodgers who sought 
to "deprive their fell ow citizens of any share of the state's great 
abundance. 1132 He criticized the state press for its lack of concern 
for the suffering and for contributing to the apathy of the public. 
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The gove:rnor pleaded with his listeners to write their state repre-
sentatives and demonstrate their support for Roosevelt, Marland, and 
the New Deal in Oklahoma.33 
While the gove:rnor was admonishing the legislature for its failure 
to act, the relief problem created a crisis. The federal relief allot-
ment was reduced by an administrative delay, and relief payments were 
reduced proportionately. This situation caused severe distress among 
unemployed and hungry people who depended on these funds for their 
existence. In McAlester a crowd of more than 300 people gathered at 
the Pittsburg County courthouse to protest the shortage of funds. 34 
This group of dissidents claimed that they would remain at the 
courthouse until their demands for relief were met. Governor Marland 
hastily di:spatched two truckloads of rations from the National Guard 
Commissary to feed the protesters.35 
Realizing the political implications of the crisis, Marland 
pressured the house of representatives. Referring to the crisis in 
Pittsburg County, he publicly lamented that the bottleneck in the 
legislature was responsible because there were no funds at his dis-
posal. Sending rations to feed hung!"'IJ people, he continued, was the 
only option available. The legislature had passed a measure creating 
a state welfare board but had not appropriated the necessary funds 
for adequate relief. Because of administrative difficulties money 
for relief would not be available until April. 36 However, the hungry 
demonstrators wanted neither excuses nor temporary rations. The two 
truckloads of food were left untouched by the crowd. A committee of 
the dissidents met with Gove:rnor Marland in the capitol to explain 
the situation and to plead for assistance. The governor infonned the 
44 
committee that he would be unable to help them unless the legislature 
approved his recovery board measures, and the committee remained in 
Oklahoma City to observe the legislature in action. Spurred into 
action by the hostile witnesses and the urgent crisis, the senate 
speedily approved a bill appropriating $600,000 for emergency relief 
for the final two weeks of March. These funds were to be distributed . 
by the federal relief administration, as the administrative facilities 
of the state were not yet in operation. While the previously recal-
citrant house was considering increasing the appropriation to prove 
its willingness to help, the federal relief allotment was received 
, 
. and the issue was allowed to rest momentarily.37 Hol'.iever, thi,s crisis 
demonstrated the necessity for relief appropriations. 
Despite Marland's persistent appeals, the opposition continued 
in the house of representatives, ":and-.his proposals emerged at the 
.end of the session considerably altered. The legislature appropriated 
only $2,500,000 for relief, one-half the sum proposed by the governor. 
The housing and new industries boards were killed in the house. The 
state planning board and the flood control and conservation board 
were both established but with accompanying appropriations which 
were only a fraction of the amount suggested by lfarland. 'rhe sales 
tax remained at the previous rate of 1 percent, although it was 
expanded somewhat to include several services as well as gross sales. 
The one cent gasoline tax and the insurance prem:J,.um tax also failed.38 
The conservative faction did not completely destroy the governor's 
program. P~rts of the plan were enacted despite the attrition in the 
legislature. Additional revenue for the state was provided by taxes 
on incomes,· inheritances, cigarettes,, and gross production of oil, 
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in addition to the modified sales tax. The state planning and flood 
control boards, although handicapped by limited funds, offered a 
system through which the state's problems could be studied and a plan 
of action proposed which would allow closer cooperation with the 
federal government in recovery activities. The legislature also 
appropriated $8,2007000 yearly for the support of the common schools. 39 
The governor had at least obtained partial fulfillment of his expect-
ations and had partially succeeded in bringing the New Deal to 
Oklahoma. He had exerted himself repeatedly to get his program through 
in its entirety, but unexpected opposition diluted the force of the 
"Little New Deal." 
Despite the relative successes, Marland remained dissatisfied 
with the portions of his suggestions that had survived the legislative 
trimming. In a speech before a banquet of the Comanche County League 
of Young Democrats on May 16, 1935, he renewed his attack on the 
legislature. He denounced Phillips and the other members of the 
house for their failure to implement the program that the voters had 
overwhelmingly approved the previous November. He told Oklahomans 
that they had been "cruelly betrayed by your own house of representa-
tives. n40 He stated that if the people of Oklahoma did not want his 
program, he did not want the job of governor. Harland proposed to 
carry his fight for the New Deal to the voters by submitting some 
of the defeated measures to them in a special election. Accusing the . 
representatives of not representing the true feelings of their con-
stituents, he suggested that "the people must pass laws until 
representatives are elected in a year and a half. 1141- He rejected the 
excuses offered by Phillips and the legislators who said that their 
constituents did not want to pay for his scheme, telling his listeners 
that "you know you can't get something for nothing. 1142 He called on 
the people of Oklahoma to strive with him toward the ultimate goal 
of economic and social security.43 
Marland displayed his willingness to fight in his struggle to 
secure relief appropriations. He did not think that the revenue meas-
ures passed by the legislature were sufficient to meet the demands 
of the people and favored placing an initiative measure on the ballot 
for the election in September. The legislature had referred four 
issues to the voters before adjourning. The initiative measure favored 
by the governor was to provide for a commission for old age pensions 
and social security which would have powers to obtain revenues 
beyond those granted by the legislature. This petition was held up 
in court by hearings on the sufficiency of the signatures. The gover-
nor was not to be denied again; he issued an executive proclamation 
which placed the initiative measure on the ballot.44 The measure was 
approved 204,626 votes to 78,783,45 butt.his action was declared 
void in February of 1936 when the state supreme court ruled that the 
governor's autonomous action was unconstitutional. 46 
Marland also supported an initiative petition which appropriated 
$2,500,000 for relief purposes. This was approved by the voters in 
a special election in December of 1935 by a vote of 82,462 to 45,079.47 
It was passed primarily by the votes of poverty-stricken people who, 
of course, had a zj.tal personal interest in its passage. While this 
action won the support of many under-privileged Oklahomans and in-
creased the governor's popularity as a humanitarian, it also caused 
unrest about his abuse of the governmental process.48 
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In addition to his strenuous efforts to spread the social benefits 
of the New Deal, Marland continued his active interest in the petro-
leum industry as governor of one of the major oil-producing states. 
The primary focus of his attention was the formation of an alliance 
among the states to regulate and conserve petroleum. He sponsored 
meetings at his home in Ponca City in December of 1934 and January 
of 1935 to discuss with other governors and governors-elect the 
possibility of a compact between the states to allow them to cooperate 
in the conservation of their valuable mineral wealth.h9 'rhey agreed 
to reconvene in Dallas, Texas, in February of 1935 to draft such a 
compact. At the session in Dallas Harland was instrumental in securing 
the adoption of the Interstate Oil Compact by the representatives of 
the governments of Texas, Oklahoma, California, New Mexico, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Illinois, and Michigan. He stressed the need for conser-
vation of oil and for the cooperation of the states in keeping small 
wells open. He stated that regulation could come either by federal 
assumption of responsibility or by the interstate compact plan. Through 
the latter the states could maintain their sovereignty and control of 
the oil resources would remain with the people who were familiar 
with the needs and problems of the industry. Marland asserted that 
by voluntarily assuming responsibility for conservation and wise use 
of natural resources, the states could avoid being forced to surrender 
control to the federal government and could actively correct the prob-
lems of the industry before conditions worsened.50 
The Interstate Oil Compact was submitted to the several state 
legislatures for ratification and to Congress for approval. Congress 
passed a resolution of approval in August of 1935, and in September 
the representatives of the states which had ratified the agreement 
met in Oklahoma City and formed the Interstate Compact Corrunission, 
consisting of one member from each oil-producing signatory state. 5l 
The establishment of this commission was a major step in the self-
regulation of the industry. 
Governor Marland' s first year in office was an eventful one in 
which he encountered unexpected difficulty in achieving his goals. 
He displayed an uncharacteristic aggressiveness in his struggle to 
secure adoption of his New Deal for Oklahoma. He expressed disbelief 
that people might place concern for financial considerations above 
their desire to help their less fortunate fellow human beings and 
consequently blamed the state legislature for not reflecting the 
will of the people. He was fully convinced that the efficiency uhich 
he had applied to the administration of the state governr:1ent would 
bring Oklahoma out of the throes of economic unrest. He applied 
business techniques of management to the operation of the executive 
department, but he knew that planning and organization meant little 
unless the rest of the state government cooperated with the exec-
utive branch and gave legal and financial sanction to his proposals. 
Marland was dismayed but not defeated. He sought to continue to 
exert his influence in state and national politics to bring about 
responsible, effective governmental solutions to the problems created 
by the depression. 
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CHAP.l'ER. rJ 
POLITICS AND PARTIAL SUCCESS 
Although Governor Marland had pledged to bring the New Deal to 
Oklahoma, he encountered unexpected opposition in 1935 from the con-
servatives in the legislature who were led by Leon Phillips. After he 
failed to gain complete legislative approval of the "Little New Deal, 11 
Marland decided to seek a new office, one which he could use to 
influence recovery at the national and state level. As governor, Mar-
land submitted many proposals to the legislature but his ideas had 
be.en only partially accepted. The next session of the legislature 
was scheduled to convene in January of 1937. During the intervening 
time between sessions, Marland could implement little of his program 
\ 
except through the use of executive proclamations or special elections, 
which he used frequently. However, his personal ambition stirred 
him to find another means of helping the state. 
Early in 1936 Marland announced his candidacy for the United 
States Senate. The term of the incumbent, Senator Thomas Pryor Gore, 
was to expire, and Marland sought to replace him. '.i.'he governor based 
his candidacy on cooperation in the Senate with the Roosevelt adr.1.ini-
stration. Senator Gore had opposed many New Deal measures and vowed 
to continue his opposition if re-elected. Taking advantage of the 
popular sentiment for Roosevelt and the New Deal, Marland entered 
the campaign to strengthen the president's support in the Senate. 1 
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Two other candidates challenged Marland and Gore. Congressman 
Joshua Bryan Lee of Norman, an ardent New Dealer and effective public 
speaker, entered the campaign and took a position similar to Marland' s. 
Lee promised to remove the anti-New Deal influence of Gore and to 
support President Roosevelt. The candidacy of Gomer Smith brought 
the issue of pensions for the elderly into the campaign. Smith was 
the national vice-president of the Townsend Plan Clubs, which advo-
cated the enactment of monthly pensions for the elderly as a solution 
to the economic problems of the country. 2 
Marland and Lee, running on nearly identical platforms, spent 
little time campaigning against each other. Senator Gore was con-
sidered the front-runner in the campaign; therefore, the other 
candidates concentrated on capturing enough votes in the primar.1 to 
win a place in the run-off election against the veteran statesman. 
The voters were to choose among one conservative anti-New Dealer and 
three liberals to fill the senatorial seat. Gomer Smith, running on 
the promise to provide pensions for the elderly, was too strongly 
identified with a single issue to win, but he had enough support to 
make the other candidates seriously consider the pension issue. 3 
Marland had an advantage over the other candidates with regard to 
pensions for the elderly, and the issue became a major part of his 
campaign. He had led the initiative campaign for pensions 1·Jhich cul-
minated in the passage of a pension measure in September of 1935 in 
a special election. He had placed the pension measure on the ballot 
by proclamation, an action which was declared unconstitutional by 
the state supreme court in February of 1936. 4 With the voter-approved 
pension declared null and void because of his action, he promised 
that the matter would surface again. The voters received another 
chance to enact pension legislation during the primary, a fact that 
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was not overlooked by the governor; he hoped to attract a significant 
number of votes with the favorable identification he had received 
regarding pensions.5 
Marland wanted the state to provide funds to match the federal 
pension payments, thereby providing a total of thirty dollars per 
month for each recipient. His energetic concern for pensions was 
based on his feud with the legislature. He justified his actions and 
his support for the plan by lambasting the recalcitrant legislature 
which had not provided for pensions in 1935. 6 The volatile conflict 
between the governor and the legislature was revived during the 
campaign. Senator Gore charged in his campaign speeches that Harland 
was using the issue of social security as a political instrument to 
enhance his image. Gore claimed that if Marland wanted pensions for 
Oklahomans, he could simply call the legislature into special session 
and have them enact legislation instead of committing himseli' to the 
initiative campaign. Marland retorted that the legislature had ample 
opportunity to provide pensions during the regular session but had 
not done so. He maintained that because the smne legislators were 
still in office, they would not approve of pensions; therefore, the 
initiative was the best way for Oklahomans to insure themselves of 
social security.7 
The pension proposal supported by Marland was a more conservative 
plan than that advocated by Gomer Smith and the supporters of the 
controversial Townsend Plan, which called for monthly pensions of 
$200. The voters who were interested in pensions had much to gain 
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by the election of Smith if his plan was enacted, but his program 
was too radical in the eyes of government officials and therefore 
had little chance of becoming a reality. Because of the difference in 
the amount of financial responsibility to be assumed by the state 
government and the taxpayers, the matching plan proposed by Governor 
Marland and the New Deal was more appealing to the voters. It was 
also more politically pragmatic because of its more conservative 
structure. Harland's identification with this measure and his earlier 
efforts to secure social legislation gave hir.i additional strength and 
helped him to take votes from Smith, but the governor did not rel;y 
on the isolated issue of pensions. He also developed his strong ties 
(j. 
with the New Deal to widen his appeal to the voters. u 
Governor Harland based his senatorial campaign on the same issues 
. that had made his gubernatorial campaign successful. He wanted to 
help Oklahomans receive a fair share of national recovery approp-
riations and programs. The governor uncharacteristically criticized 
the national administration because he believed that Oklahoma had 
been slighted. The national government had reduced federal spending 
in the state and had caused delays in relief and public works acti-
vities. Marland's ire was raised also by the president's policy of 
non-intervention in the senatorial campaign. ~·fuile it was politically 
wise for Roosevelt to abstain from endorsing particular candidates, 
his support would have aided each of them. 9 The president did not wish 
to antagonize the already uncooperative Senator Gore by campaigning 
against him, and he did not want to damage the candidacy of Congress-
man Lee, who pledged to continue supporting the New Deal. Roosevelt 
would not have endorsed the radical Smith in any case. ·while Harland 
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had been cooperative and vocal in support of the president's policies, 
Roosevelt could not afford to endorse him at the risk of antagonizing 
the Senator or the Congressman. Political implications therefore 
prevented Marland from gaining the president's valuable recognition. 
The former businessman put his administrative ability and lmack 
for planning to efficient use during the campaign. He had a well-
organized staff headed by his friend and advisor, Howard DraV;:e, 1-:ho 
had ·managed Marland's gubernatorial campaign and had played a promi-
nent role in recovery activities in the state. Harland made judicious 
use of the advantage he had on the employees of the state in gathering 
votes. His solicitation of support was accompanied by implications 
of loss of employment if he lost the senatorial race. His campaign 
organization was an efficient network of supporters and campaign 
. 10 
workers who spread his propaganda throughout the state. 
'rhe governor was plagued during the campaign by the recurring 
issue of repeal of prohibition. Repeal advocates in the state hoped 
to bring the question to a vote in July, and thus the volatile issue 
was injected into the campaign. Marland held that repeal was fine if 
the people of the state voted for it. He pointed out that the con-
sumption of alcohol was already widespread in Oklahoma and referred 
to the failure of the "noble experiment" on the national level. 
Because of the activities of bootleggers, liquor was readily obtain-
able in the state despite laws to the contrary. The governor asserted 
that the state, not the bootleggers, should be receiving revenue 
from the sale and control of alcohol, out he expressed his dismay 
that the question had been brought into the campaign. He believed 
that it would draw the attention of the voters away from the important 
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political aspects of the senatorial race. To the governor the dominant 
issues were the continuation of the New Deal and the achievement of 
social security for Oklahomans. He feared that the furor about repeal 
would overshadow the political qualifications of the candidates, part-
icularly himself because he was identified as a "wet," and adversely 
affect the outcome of the race. 
Marland hoped for a boom in support in 1936 similar to that Nhich 
swept him into the governor's mansion in 1934. He waged an intensive 
speaking tour of the state in the latter stages of the car.lpaign, but 
the boom did not materialize. The election took a surprising turn, 
with the vote totals different than most observers expected: the 
two f orrner congressmen won the top positions in the election. Whereas 
Senator Gore had been expected to be the front-runner, he carne in a 
dismal fourth in the balloting and thus ended a long career. The 
personable, eloquent Joshua Lee had captured the hearts and votes of 
many people in the state by using effective campaign methods and had 
developed a groundswell of support which grew as the day of the elec-
tion approached. Lee received 168,030 votes to Harland's 121,433. 
Gomer Smith was third ·with 119,585, and the elderly Senator Gore 
closed his last campaign with 91,581 votes. 11 With Snith and Gore 
eliminated from contention, the two leading contenders were placed 
in a run-off primary to be held on July 2s. 12 
Despite Harland's efficient political machinery, his emphasis on 
the New Deal, and his advocacy of social security, he did not win 
the first primaI"J. Because a majority of the voters had not cast their 
ballots in favor of any of the four contenders, he refused to concede 
def eat and continued his campaign on the issues of social security 
and the New Deal, as did Lee. Marland openly courted the followers 
of the eliminated Gomer Smith, hoping to accumulate enough additional 
votes to win. l3 'rhe initiative pension measure had passed in the elec-
ti on along with an increase in the sales tax to provide funds for 
the program. 14 Marland hoped that his connection i·tlth the plan would 
transfer the disappointed followers of Smith to the Harland colunm. 
The run-off campaign forced the voters to choose between a congress-
man and a governor, both New Dealers, for their representative in 
the United States Senate. The campaign became one of voter preference 
for one man or the other, with Lee's speaking ability a determining 
factor in the outcome. 15 Lee won the election 1·tlth 301,141 votes to 
16 Marland's 186,885. 
Governor Marland appeared to have been the candidate most likely 
to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters. He stood adarnantl;'/ for the 
popular New Deal and had done all in his power to help the state 
recover from the depression during his short time in office. He was 
a staunch advocate of social security for his fellow Oklahomans. He 
personally favored repeal of prohibition, but did not want the re-
action to the issue to harm him politically; consequently, he did not 
come out strongly in favor of it. He felt that the depression was 
more important than the debate over consumption of alcohol. I-Iarland. 
was identified as a "wet," however, and Lee's imac;e as an ardent 
prohibitionist gave him the votes of the "dry" advocates. 17 It is 
also probable that the voters, 1·men faced 1·tlth a choice between 
the two advocates of the New Deal, chose to maximize their benefits 
by retaining one man in the governor's mansion and sending one man 
to the chambers of the Senate. By this arrangement, Oklahoma could 
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benefit by the efforts of key men on both the state and national 
level. The primary vote and the run-off result, although a personal 
defeat for the governor, demonstrated the acceptance of the Hew Deal 
18 by Oklahomans. 
One of the criticisms voiced by the press and by Harland's oppo-
nents during and after the primary campaign was that he had used the 
administrative structure of the state for political purposes. Rumors 
surfaced throughout the campaign that employees of the state, partic-
ularly those in the executive branch, had been pressured into giving 
their support to Marland's candidacy. 19 Moreover, Harland had closely 
linked his candidacy with the continuance of social security and 
relief benefits. Because the governor was responsible for many of 
the benefits, the ·implication, whether subtle or direct, was that 
their continuation hinged on his success. This political maneuvering 
created resentment which was reflected in Lee's victory. 20 
During Harland's senatorial campaign in 1936, he was confronted 
with a crisis involving the state government and the municipal govern-
ment of Oklahoma City. The problem centered on the oil drilling 
activities in the city. On March 24, 1936, the voters of Oklahoma 
City approved an extension of drilling zones in the area north of 
the state capitol building. The state ewned the land on which the 
capitol building was located, and this land was not included in the 
d ·11· 21 n ing zone. 
The difficulties arose because of the proY.imity of the new drilling 
sites to the state-owned land. As the city's land was approved for 
drilling and that of the state was not, wells which were sunk near 
the capitol complex would drain the oil and gas which lay underneath. 
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The former oilman, now in the governor's office, was well aware of 
the tremendous financial loss the state would suffer if its subter-
ranean treasure was pumped out by adjacent wells. Harland believed 
that the state was entitled to the revenue produced by any underlying 
resources. The state would benefit by the sale of leases for drilling 
and royalties from the sale of the oil. 22 
Because the state's land was not included in the new drilling 
zones authorized by the election, Harland exercised his authority 
to allow drilling activities and tap the oil and gas from the state's 
property. He authorized the state board of affairs to ask for bids 
on oil and gas leases on state land. 23 By taking this action Harland 
was defying the city because the state capitol was within the city 
limits and the municipal government had not approved the drilling 
activities. The governor's action was technically illegal, and indig-
nant city officials sought an injunction to prevent drilling on the 
capitol complex. The determined governor then declared martial law 
within the boundaries of the state capitol complex in Oklahoma City. 
To prevent municipal officials from interfering with drilling activ-
ities which already were taking plaoe, he placed members of the state 
militia on patrol in the area. 24 
The governor was not attempting to usurp the power of the muni-
cipal government by this precipitous action; his motive was to protect 
the interests of the state. City officia~s did not question the 
right of ownership of the natural resources, only the autonomous 
action of the state in allowing drilling within the city limits. The 
city officials scheduled another election for the ?Ur.pose of extending 
the zone of authorized drilling to include the capitol area, thereby 
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legalizing the action of the state. 25 The state's claim of sovereignty 
on its land was upheld in court, but Marland' s action in declaring 
martial law was declared void. The crisis over, the city's suit was 
dismissed, the troops were withdrawn from the capitol grounds, and 
hannony was restored between city and state. 26 Harland was pleased 
with the outcome of the affair, because he planned to use the revenue 
from the production of the wells for the improvement of the capitol 
complex. He estimated that the state should receive $2 7000 7000 durinr, 
the first year of operation of the wells. 27 
Marland had the best interests of Oklahoma in mind in this con-
frontation between city and state. The state maintained control of 
the leases and received payments for the drilling rights and royalties. 
'rhe revenue obtained by the state was used for such necessary projects 
as the construction of new office facilities. The governor demon-
strated once again his interest in the welfare of all Oklahomans. 
Although his activities in this matter were not part of his senatorial 
campaign, he probably increased his stature in the eyes of his fellow 
citizens. 
The political machine:rJ for which the governor was criticized 
continued to operate even after his personal defeat in the primary. 
He directed his attention to the various legislative races in the 
state. He had encountered problems with the conservative members of 
the legislature who crippled his program and had warned the legls-
lators that he would oppose them in 1936. 28 He devoted his personal 
effort and political influence to preventing the reoccurrence of a 
similar ordeal in the legislative session of 1937. The governor 
and his associates let it be kno"Vm that they opposed the re-election 
of the solons who had opposed the program of the administration and 
who had, according to Marland, betrayed the trust of their consti-
tuents. 29 A concerted effort was made to assure the election of a 
legislature sympathetic to the goals of the governor, and the fore-
most target was Leon C. Phillips, the fonner speaker of the house. 
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The governor's supporters initially tried to defeat Phillips in his 
bid for re-election by naming their own candidate and propagandizing 
against Phillips.30 
Despite their energetic efforts, the dynamic conservative was 
renominated and virtually assured of victory in November. Nith the 
return of his old nemesis irrnninent, the governor concentrated on 
diluting Phillips' s conservative influence by preventing him from 
becoming speaker in the next session.31 Marland's forces supported 
J. T. Daniel of Waurika for the position. Throughout the struc;gle 
for influence, the administration held the club of patronage over 
the heads of the members to gain support for the governor's plans.32 
The intimidation by the administration paid dividends. When the 
legislature caucused after the election in November of 1936, Daniel 
was elected speaker. The fiery, red-haired Phillips withdrew from 
the race when he realized the strength of the forces that Marland had 
marshalled against him. Although he surrendered in the face of the 
governor's power, he did not relinquish his strong stand against 
further unnecessary spending. He continue<;l. actively in the position 
of leader of the opposition.33 
With a sympathetic legislature effectively organized, lfarland 
decided to call it into special session. He had contemplated this 
action earlier but had hesitated because of his uncertainty about 
the attitude of the legislators. He now identified several r.iatters 
which he believed had to be dealt with as soon as possible.34 When 
the session convened on November 24, 1936, the governor addressed 
both houses. He infonned them that he would only submit a dozen 
matters for their consideration which could not be delayed until 
the regular session in January of 1937. He asked them to consider 
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legislation concerning drought relief, tax exemption for homesteads, 
further relief appropriations, unemployment compensation, and the 
need for a state law enforcement agency.35 
The absence of Phillips from the speaker's chair apparently 
removed many inhibitions about spending among the legislators~ 'rhey 
approved a plan under which the state would cooperate with the federal 
government to provide unemployment insurance. Relief payments were 
continued with an appropriation of $1,500,000 for distribution by 
the State Welfare Commission. The total appropriated for relief 
purposes, including free textbooks and provisions for medical care, 
was $2,050,000. The legislature also approved ta,""{ exemption for 
homesteads. Many proposals such as those dealing with the federal 
Resettlement Administration and drought relief were delayed by legis-
06 lative committees but were rescheduled for the regu.lar session.J 
The regular session convened on January 5, 1937, and heard the 
governor describe the condition of the state. Harland asserted that 
conditions had improved since he took office but that r.iuch of the 
impro'irement was superficial or artificial. He maintained that the 
real problem was still the system under which the state had operated 
since 1907. He called for a re-examination of the political and econ-
omic institutions which made the state unable to deal effectively 
with its problems. The problems of a modern age could not.be solved 
by using outli'd.ated methods. Marland pointed out the disparity between 
the wealth of the state and the distressing conditions therein and 
blamed the situation on the failure of the old system. He recommended 
new approaches to the unique problems caused by the depression. Much 
of the distress, he maintained, had not been relieved because pol-
itical leaders had been hesitant about taking unprecedented action 
with regard to social security. Marland asserted that the waste of 
human and natural resources which was still painfully evident neces-
sitated the use of new tactics. For example, the governor asked 
his constituents to reconsider their attitudes about ta.,':ation. Much 
early opposition to his proposals had been motivated primarily by 
financial considerations. Taxpayers and their representatives had 
protested against the expenditure of millions of dollars for relief 
become the money had to come from those most able to pay. Marland 
gently chided the taxpayers for their selfishness. He suggested that 
they should not look upon taxes as a burden; rather, the knowledge 
that their money was being spent for the benefit of those less for-
tunate should be ample return for their investment. The governor 
asserted that part of the problem was that most people wanted to see 
a definite return for their tax dollars similar to the return on any 
investment. The man who had been so generous with his personal for-
tune assured them that "the masses of the people get more for their 
tax dollars than they receive for any other dollars they spend. 1137 
Marland asked the legislators to make substantial appropriations, 
particularly relief funds, to meet the needs of the public, but he 
warned them that they should also enact sufficient revenue measures 
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to provide funds, thereby avoiding a deficit in the state's budget. 
He urged continued oooperation with the federal plan for recovery 
but warned that the state must assume its full share of the burden 
and not "sit back with folded hands and say 'Let Uncle Sam do it. 1138 
He closed by pledging his support and cooperation in finding adequate 
solutions to Oklahoma's problems.39 
Ostensibly the stage was set for an effective crusade against 
the depression. The special session had allowed the legislators time 
to get acquainted and dispense with the opening formalities and 
difficulties of the regular session. 4o With the legislators organized 
and ready to work, the fulfillment of Marland's dream seemed at hand. 
The legislature, however, proceeded aimlessly and haphazardly along 
the road to recovery. 'rhe governor had not outlined a specific plan 
but had trusted the wisdom and judgement of the representatives. 
By not offering specific proposals he avoided the sniping at his 
plans which had occurred during the legislative session of 1935. 
He evidently assumed that with control of the house in the hands of 
men friendly to the administration, he would have his own "100 Days 
War." Without definite proposals from the governor, however, the 
legislators proceeded without unity or direction and concerned them-
selves with relatively minor and local problems.41 
As the session progressed and little legislation of substance was 
enacted, the governor decided to assert his leadership and provide 
direction to the legislature. He urged legislators to postpone their 
consideration of bills concerning local or minor issues until the 
urgent needs of the state had been met. With this boost form the 
governor, they embarked on a spending spree unprecedented in the 
66 
history of the state. They appropriated $6,000 1 000 for relief pur-
poses, in addition to the more than $2,000 7000 provided by the 
special session. Pensions for the elderly received nearly $20,000,000, 
state institutions more than $19 1000,000, and common schools more 
than $25,000,000. Numerous additional appropriations provided for 
the regular operation of the state government. When the last gavel 
fell, the state was obligated to pay more than $115 1000,000. OY..lahoma 
had finally adopted the tactics of the Roosevelt administration by 
attacking the state•s problems regardless of the cost.42 
As the salons completed their task, Governor Marland appeared 
before them and praised their accomplishment. He had achieved his 
goal of social security for Oklahomans, although at an enormous cost. 
It was, however, a qualified success. The legislators had appropriated 
freely for many programs but had not followed the governor's advice 
by providing sufficient revenue measures to prevent a deficit. They 
yielded to popular opposition by not increasing truces enough to meet 
the state's financial obligations. Marland favored true increases 
because of the purposes for which the revenue was to be used. Once 
again the conservative faction had held the line on taxation by its 
active opposition to revenue measures, but it had not stopped the 
excessive appropriations. The Sixteenth Legislature was branded 
with the responsibility for saddling the state with a deficit.43 
With the termination of the legislative session, Governor Harland 
had his .f:i.n:aL ,o,pp.ort.unity to implement his New Deal. He had to take 
what he had been given by the legislature and work with it. Many of 
his original proposals had not been acted upon; nevertheless, his 
lobbying proved to be a positive influence in securing social 
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legislation for all Oklahomans. Horeover, Marland had been a prominent 
spokesman for those he identified as the common people. After the 
legislature adjourned, he was consigned merely-to fulfilling the 
normal functions of the governorship, but he had plans for furthering 
his personal political ambition and continuing the New Deal for 
Oklahoma. 
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CHAPl'ER V 
AMBI'rION UNFULFILLED 
Late in 1937, Marland once again burst forth into the political 
arena. He armounced that he would seek the Democratic nomination for 
the United States Senate. The seat was held by the veteran statesman 
Elmer Thomas of Lawton. Once again Marland faced an incumbent who 
was supported widely. This time, however, he faced an incumbent and 
a New Dealer in the same opponent. 'rhomas was popular and was close 
to the Roosevelt administration. Also in the race was Gomer Smith, 
a perennial candidate for public office. Although he faced fonnidable 
opposition, Marland lmew that. his term as governor was drawing to a 
close, and he had to seek another office from which to continue in 
his role as a reformer. He hoped to gain support by running on his 
1 favorable record as governor. 
Harland's candidacy received a serious jolt when the Oklahoma 
Public Welfare Cormnission, 1-Jhich he had helped to establish and 
with which he was closely identified in the public eye, became 
involved in a scandal. Federal investigations of alleged corruption 
in the administration of relief payments revelled that the rolls of 
the welfare cormnission contained the names of many who were ineligible 
2 for payments. As the evidence of bureaucratic malfe'asance mounted, 
the federal government took authority away from the state's welfare 
organization until its affairs were put in order. 3 Governor Marland 
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was not directly involved in the mismanagement of the pension rolls, 
but it had an adverse affect on his public image and his administra-
tion because of his connection with the establishment of welfare 
organizations in the state. The scandal and the public reaction 
gave critics of the New Deal another- opportunit;y to bemoan the 
takeover of the state government by bureaucrats with good intentions 
but few qualifications. 
The senatorial campaign of 1938 was given a special flavor by 
the announcement that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on his 
travels through the southern states, would visit Oklahoma in July. 4 
Interested political observers in the state speculated about the 
effect the president's visit would have on the various political 
races. Roosevelt's blessing on any of the candidates would be a 
tremendous boost in the eyes of the public. The senatorial prir.iary 
contest presented a tense problem because Governor Marland, as a 
prominent Democrat and chief executive of the state, was expected 
to serve the ceremonial role of host to the visiting president. How-
ever, Senator Thomas was the candidate closest to the Roosevelt 
administration politically and was e.:>.."'})ected to be at the president's 
side throughout his stay in Oklahoma. With two prominent candidates 
for the United States Senate thus in his shadow, Roosevelt was placed 
in an awkward situation. He could not maintain a hands-off policy 
as he had done in 1936 because he would be in personal contact with 
the candidates, and the public would be waiting to see whether he 
endorsed anyone. He could not overtly endorse either candidate at 
the risk of embarassing or alienating the other. Thomas had been a 
staunch supporter of Roosevelt in the Senate; IIarland had been an 
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energetic spokesman for the New Deal since 1932 and was largely 
responsible for whatever success the president's programs had enjoyed 
in Oklahoma. 5 
President Roosevelt arrived in Oklahoma City on July 9, 19381 
after making brief stops at a few smaller totrms on his route. He 
and his entourage went to the fairgrounds to meet the public. The 
pil:'esident delivered a short speech as listeners waited to see what 
he had to say about the political races in the state. On the platform 
with him were prominent dignitaries and public officials, including 
Governor Marland and Senator Thomas. In his speech the president 
talked in general terms about Oklahoma and the nation, making a 
subtle dig at former governor Murray with regard to the gubernatorial 
primary campaign. He judiciously avoided direct mention of the sena-
torial contest, although he mentioned Senator Thomas as an old friend. 
Governor Marland received mention by the president not for his dili-
gent efforts to follow the path outlined by Roosevelt, but for his 
work in the area of oil conservation and regulation. 'rhe president 
also mentioned the progress made by public works in Oklahoma but 
·f· dit 6 gave no one speci ic ere • 
The lack of an endorsement by the president seemed to be a fatal 
blow to Marland' s hopes, but he chose not look at the incident as 
a rebuff, preferring to claim that the president was neutral in his 
comments. Marland said afterward that Roosevelt had talked about "the 
future and the welfare of democracy, but he didn't put his arm 
around anybody. 117 The frustrating snub by the leader he had tried 
to emulate for the past four years had its effect in the election. 
Marland placed third in the balloting, garnerint:; 115,625 votes to 
Thomas's 252,550 and Gomer Smith's 190,774. 8 Harland's legislative 
defeats had hurt him; now his personal nrnbition was dealt a mortal 
blow. 
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To compound the tragedy of the personal defeat, Harland saw his 
program meet with di sf av or in the election. His old nemesis Leon 
Phillips won the Democratic nomination for governor in the July 
primary. Phillips defeated his nearest opponent, W. S. Key, by a 
total of 179,139 votes to 176,034. 9 Key ran on a platform supporting 
the New Deal, and although it was by a small margin, his defeat 
demonstrated that the New Deal as implemented by Marland was losing 
favor with the people. The neA>t highest vote total was the more than 
14a,ooo garnered by anti-New Dealer and former governor William 
Murray. Phillips supported the New Deal as a Democrat, but was not 
as enthusiastic about federal intervention in the economy as Ilarland. 
had been. In his campaign he capitalized on the spending of the 
Marland administration and the struggles regardine patronage. The 
victory by the conservative Phillips signalled a new movement toward 
retrenchment and economy in state government in Oklahoma. 10 
Marland left office in January of 1939 after addressine the 
legislature for the final time. He acceded def eat by telling the new 
members of the legislature that he would summarize the gains of his 
administration and would not recommend any future action, leavine 
that task to incoming governor Phillips. Marland recited in great 
detail the accomplishments of his term in office. IIe suggested that 
the program for social security passed during his term helped to 
retard human erosion as well as to conserve the resources of the 
state. He mentioned the welfare organizations which had been 
established largely due to his influence, his work with the Inter-
state Oil Compact, and the efforts of the state to help all its 
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people with improved prisons, schools, and asylums. He blamed the 
deficit which was then evident in the state budget on the nationwide 
recession which took place after the legislature had passed its appro-
priations and reverrue bills. The outgoing governor stated that despite 
all that had been done, the condition of the state was still fun-
damentally bad. He told the solons that they had a heavy respon-
sibility in trying to insure that their fellow men were adequately 
cared for in times of hardship. 11 He bid adieu to the le[7,islators 
by reiterating what had become his creed while in office: "Govern-
ment is not worthy of the name that does not devote itself to the 
solutions of the problems of labor and unemployment so vital to 
the general welfare .• 1112 He left for Ponca City after Phillips' s 
inauguration, returning to private life after six strenuous years 
in public service. 
Marland tried to establish another oil compan~r, but the half-
hearted effort met with failure. He was forced by financial necessity 
to abandon his palatial home and to move into a smaller house. 13 He 
endured periodic sickness but still retained enough of his ambition 
to seek public office once again. In 1940 he sought to regain his 
old seat in Congress. He challenged the incumbent, Phil Ferguson of 
Woodward, in the Democratic primary. He curtailed his campaigning 
because of his ill health, however, and was soundly defeated in the 
primary. 14 The man who had such boundless energy when he was pur-
suing fortunes or his dream of a humanitarian society maintained 
a low profile thereafter and remained at home. On October 3, 1941, 
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Ernest Whitworth Marland succumbed to a heart ailment in Ponca City, 
the town he had nurtured to maturity. His death was mourned through-
out the state and nation by former business associates, political 
allies,-political enemies, and people who had been rescued from the 
depths of despair by his efforts. Regardless of personal or political 
animosity, many Oklahomans were saddened by the passing of a man whose 
contributions to his adopted state had been legion. 15 
Many changes occurred in the United States in the sixty-seven 
years of Ernest Harland's life, a life that was symbolic of the 
change which occurred in the nation during that time. Born into a 
world of free enterprise and rugged individualism, his ambition led 
him into successful careers in the petroleum industry. He enjoyed the 
benefits of the American system without regard to the repercussions 
which might occur later. Marland lost his fortune and finally began 
to search for the flaws which allowed such a catastrophe to happen. 
Finding the answers in his own experience and those of other Americans, 
he realized that the problem might have been avoided with foresight 
on the part of the leaders of the nation, both political and economic. 
Marland believed that the most effective instrumentality for the exer-
cise of planning and foresight was the government. His experience as 
a businessman and as a congressman led him to speculate that he 
could apply the same plann:ing which worked on the national level to 
the problems of his adopted state of Oklahoma. This campaign for 
planning sounded logical and appealing to the people of Oklahoma 
who elected him governor. 
Marland' s solution of planning and cooperative effort seemed simple 
to him and others of similar pers¥asion, but many times they forgot 
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the realities of politics, economics, or even human nature. They 
realized where they wanted to go but did not lmow how to get there. 
The new goals, desirable as they might have been, had to be attained 
through old means. The New Deal as approved by the voters and en-
visioned by the governor had to go through the process of legislative 
approval. In the legislature the conflict between old and new ideas 
was exemplified. In the first encounter the old maintained control 
and prevented the new from achieving total victo!'ji-. In the second 
encounter the new gained control but in its zeal did not temper its 
extravagance or look realistically at the necessities of political 
life. The failure of the legislature to balance the budget placed 
the brand of irrationality on the reformers. The actions of the New 
Dealers when they attained authority or responsibility added fuel 
to conservative criticism. Responsibility for bureaucratic :nalfeasance 
or incompetence was not attributable to any one person. 'rhe enormity 
of the social experiment was such that problems were inevitable. How-
ever, the mistakes of the social experimenters created a reaction 
to them and their ideas. 
In his zeal to bring about the acceptance of the new idea of 
social responsibility, Marland had difficulty restraining himself. 
When he met with defeat in his initial efforts to bring in the new 
\ 
order, his frustration led him to seek every means at his disposal 
to circumvent the legislature which he believed had betrayed the 
people. His use of the initiative and his wielding of the patronage 
club were attempts to prevent success from slipping out of his 
grasp. These attempts at political manipulation served to solidify 
the opposition to him. 
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Marland' s impatience and zeal created a reaction which led to 
retrenchment in the state government, but his effect was more exten..;. 
sive and long-reaching. Although his program was only partially 
successful, he saved thousands from possible starvation and gradually 
brought the state and national recovery programs closer. As Marland 
stated in his farewell message, even after all he had done there ~rere 
still hundreds of thousands of Oklahomans in Beed of the government's 
aid. And in addition to his immediate accomplishments in the area of 
social legislation, Marland paved the way for the acceptance of 
responsibility by the government for the security of the people. 
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